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IT’S COMPLICATED: THE UNUSUAL WAY
OBERGEFELL V. HODGES LEGALIZED SAME
SEX MARRIAGE
Kristin Haule
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent Supreme Court decision, Obergefell v. Hodges,1
struck down all state laws that prohibit same-sex marriage.2 LGBT
activists and same-sex marriage proponents rejoiced,3 while
opponents of same-sex marriage lamented.4
Unfortunately, the decision fell short of providing protection
from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in non-marital
contexts, such as housing and employment.5 Instead, it declared the
right to marry “fundamental,” under the Due Process Clause,6
potentially causing problems for other state laws which regulate
 J.D., Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, May 2016. Many thanks to the members of the
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their careful and diligent efforts in bringing this Comment
through the publication process.
1. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
2. Id. at 2607.
3. See Garret Epps, The U.S. Supreme Court Fulfills Its Promises on Same-Sex Marriage,
THE ATLANTIC (June 26, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/same-sexmarriage-supreme-court-obergefell/396995/; Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Makes Same-Sex
Marriage a Right Nationwide, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
06/27/us/supreme-court-same-sex-marriage.html; Dawn Ennis, Victory at Supreme Court for
Marriage, ADVOCATE (June 25, 2015, 9:55 AM), http://www.advocate.com/politics/
marriage-equality/2015/06/25/victory-supreme-court-marriage-equality.
4. See Supreme Court Decision on Marriage “A Tragic Error” Says President of Catholic
Bishops’ Conference, U.S. CONF. CATH. BISHOPS (June 26, 2015), http://www.usccb.org/news
/2015/15-103.cfm.
5. See James Esseks, After Obergefell, What the LGBT Movement Still Needs to Achieve,
ACLU BLOG (July 7, 2015, 10:15 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speak-freely/after-obergefell
-what-lgbt-movement-still-needs-achieve; Brandon Lorenz, Historic Marriage Equality Ruling
Generates Momentum for New Non-Discrimination Law, HRC BLOG (July 7, 2015),
http://www.hrc.org/blog/entry/historic-marriage-equality-ruling-generates-momentum-for-newnon-discrimina; Jon Green, We Won on Marriage. Hiring and Housing Discrimination Are Next,
AMERICABLOG.COM (June 29, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://americablog .com/2015/06/we-won-onmarriage-hiring-housing-discrimination-next.html; Alexa Ura, Gay Rights Activists: Fight Is Only
Getting Started, TEX. TRIB. (June 29, 2015), http://www.texastribune.org/2015/06/29/gayactivists-next-fight-discrimination-protection/.
6. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599.
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marriage, and held that some nebulous combination of the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses combine to invalidate laws “in
some instances.”7
Section II of this Comment explores the legal framework of Due
Process jurisprudence, Equal Protection jurisprudence, and the cases
upon which the Obergefell Court relies that employ a sort of hybrid
Due Process/Equal Protection analysis. It also discusses the historical
framework of evolving Court decisions in the contexts of marriage,
procreation, and child rearing.
Section III of this Comment breaks down the Obergefell
decision, explaining the Court’s reasoning and justifications. Section
IV explains the potential ramifications of the reasoning in the
Obergefell decision, and Section V proposes three alternative bases
that would have limited the potential for these ramifications. Finally,
Section VI concludes that any of the three proposed alternative bases
would have minimized ambiguity in the law while simultaneously
protecting the rights of same sex couples in other, non-marital
contexts as well.
II. LEGAL & HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
The two clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment at issue in this
case are the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.8
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution provides, in relevant
part, “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”9
A. Due Process Clause
The Due Process Clause (depriving any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law) protects rights that are “so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental.”10 It protects those rights that are “fundamental to
our Nation’s particular scheme of ordered liberty and system of
justice.”11 These are rights, the deprivation of which “offend[s] those
7. Id. at 2603.
8. Id. at 2602–03.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
10. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1934) (overruled in part on other
grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)).
11. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 764 (2010) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968)).
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canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of
justice.”12 The list of “fundamental rights” is currently relatively
small. It includes many of the rights of the first eight Amendments of
the Constitution,13 which encompasses the right to obtain and use
contraception,14 among a few other rights.15
If a right is “fundamental” pursuant to the Due Process Clause,
the government may not pass a law abridging that right, unless it can
pass strict scrutiny.16
B. Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause (denying any person “equal
protection of the laws”) protects “discrete and insular minorities”
from discrimination on the basis of their protected classification.17
Not all classifications are protected, however, and the level of
protection depends on the type of classification.18 For example, laws,
which classify individuals on the basis of race, must pass strict
scrutiny.19 This requires that classifications be “narrowly tailored” to
a “compelling government interest.”20 However, laws, which classify
individuals on the basis of gender, are subject to a less exacting,
“intermediate” level of scrutiny, which only requires that the law be
“substantially related” to an “important” governmental interest.21 The
lower standard of scrutiny is due to the genuine physical differences
between the genders; Equal Protection requires only that those
“similarly situated” be treated similarly under the law, and

12. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945).
13. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 763.
14. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
15. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (mandating that children
attend public school violates the parents’ and guardians’ rights to “direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923)
(preventing schools from teaching children foreign languages prior to eighth grade violates the
parents’ right to control their children’s education); see also BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559, 586–87 (finding excessive punitive damages are an arbitrary punishment in violation of the
Due Process Clause) (Breyer, J. concurring).
16. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
17. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
18. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (noting that “all legal
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect” and
must pass “rigid scrutiny”); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding
that racial classifications which purport to be “separate but equal” are inherently unequal and run
afoul of the Equal Protection Clause).
19. Id.
20. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2717 (2013) (citations omitted).
21. Id. (citations omitted).
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sometimes physical differences justify laws, which treat the genders
differently.22 Finally, most other laws are subject only to rational
basis review, whereby the law must only be “rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.”23 “States are accorded wide latitude” with
respect to the laws they implement, and as such, most laws withstand
rational basis scrutiny.24 However, a “bare congressional desire to
harm” is not a legitimate governmental interest, even under rational
basis review.25
C. Due Process and Equal Protection Interrelation Cases
In practice, there are a number of cases that do not fit neatly into
either Due Process or Equal Protection, so the Supreme Court has
used a combination of the two clauses to invalidate certain laws.
This was perhaps first seen in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson.26 There, the Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization
Act provided a mechanism to sterilize any person convicted of three
felonies involving moral turpitude.27 Although the Court indicated it
invalidated the law on Equal Protection grounds, and therefore did
not reach the Due Process issue,28 it nonetheless decreed, “[m]arriage
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of
the race.”29 The Court then explained that under Oklahoma’s law,
people who had embezzled funds would not be sterilized, while those
who had entered a chicken coop to steal chickens would.30 The law
therefore impermissibly treated similarly-situated criminals
differently, in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause.31 But
people who are convicted of felonies of moral turpitude are not a
protected class for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause;
obviously, a basic tenet of our criminal justice system is that
different levels and classifications of crimes bring about different
levels of punishments.32 So an argument based purely on Equal
22. See id. (quoting Michael M. v. Superior Court, Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464, 471 (1981)).
23. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
24. Id.
25. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
26. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
27. Id. at 536.
28. Id. at 538.
29. Id. at 541.
30. Id. at 539.
31. Id. at 540–41.
32. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366–67 (1910) (“[I]t is a precept of justice
that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense.”).
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Protection grounds necessarily fails. To justify its result, the Court
explained that because the disparate punishment in this case was
sterilization, and procreation is “fundamental” to the survival of the
human race, a state may not classify felons who committed virtually
the same crime such that one is sterilized and the other is not.33 In
essence, the severity of the “right” in question, combined with the
severely disparate treatment was enough to exceed the threshold of
constitutionality.
Similarly, in Reynolds v. Sims,34 the Court invalidated a district
apportionment, which allowed a mere 37 percent of Alabama’s
population to control a majority of Alabama’s representatives.35
Essentially, denying a citizen equal representation on the basis of
geography violates the Equal Protection Clause.36 Again, to justify
the result, the Court relied heavily on the notion that voting is “a
fundamental political right.”37 Because Alabama wanted to limit
such an important right for people who are otherwise similarly
situated, but live in a different geographical location within
Alabama, the combination of the Due Process and Equal Protection
arguments again pushed this law over the threshold into
unconstitutionality.
Two years later, the Court followed this reasoning again to
invalidate a poll tax in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections.38
To justify its result, the Harper Court relied heavily on Reynolds and
again emphasized the “fundamental” importance of “the right of
suffrage.”39
In 1983, the Court acknowledged that sometimes the “due
process and equal protection principles converge”40 and invalidated
the revocation of probation on the basis of the defendant’s inability
to pay under a combination of both principles.41 This notion was
reiterated in 1996 in M.L.B. v. S.L.J,42 where the Court held that
people whose parental rights are being terminated have a
fundamental right to an appeal, and cannot be denied that appeal due
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Skinner, 316 U.S. at 539–41.
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Id. at 568.
Id.
Id. at 562 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 119 U.S. 356 (1886)).
383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
Id. at 667–68.
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983).
Id. at 665–66, 672.
519 U.S. 102 (1996).
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to an inability to pay record preparation fees. 43 In justifying its result
by combining the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, the
Court elaborated, “[a] precise rationale has not been composed,
because cases of this order cannot be resolved by resort to easy
slogans or pigeonhole analysis.”44
The interrelation between the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses has also arisen in the marriage context. In the landmark 1967
case, Loving v. Virginia,45 the Court invalidated state laws, which
banned interracial marriages as an impermissible racial classification
under the Equal Protection Clause.46 But then, after dedicating
eleven pages to the Equal Protection issue, the Court also declared in
a comparatively small two paragraphs that, “[m]arriage is one of the
‘basic civil rights of man’”47 and a “fundamental freedom” protected
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.48 But it
does not seem as though marriage is a fundamental right, since
thirty-one states still ban or otherwise restrict marriages between first
cousins, for example.49 If marriage were a fundamental right,
presumably any state law which interferes with the right to marry on
the basis of family relationship or age or marital status would have to
withstand strict scrutiny.
There is also jurisprudence, which involves both Due Process
and Equal Protection with regard to the fundamental right to “marital
privacy” established in Griswold v. Connecticut.50 The Griswold
court held that interfering with a married couple’s access to birth
control was an impermissible intrusion on the fundamental right to
marital privacy, in contravention of the Due Process Clause.51
In 1972, the Court extended the Griswold access to birth control
to unmarried persons in Eisenstadt v. Baird.52 Although it relied
heavily on Griswold, which hinged on the Due Process Clause,53 the

43. Id. at 107.
44. Id. at 120 (citations omitted).
45. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
46. Id. at 12.
47. Id. (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
48. Id. at 12.
49. State Laws Regarding Marriages Between First Cousins, NCSL, http://www.ncsl.org
/research/human-services/state-laws-regarding-marriages-between-first-cousi.aspx (last visited
Oct. 12, 2015).
50. 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965).
51. Id.
52. 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972).
53. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481.
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Eisenstadt Court actually held that prohibiting contraception violated
the rights of “single persons” pursuant to the Equal Protection
Clause.54 But instead of finding some protected class, the Court
instead held that the law was not rationally related to any legitimate
state interest.55
This notion was taken a step further in Lawrence v. Texas,56
where the Court invalidated laws banning intimate sexual relations
between same-sex couples under the Due Process Clause.57
However, the Court noted that both the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses were implicated in this case.58 The Court explained,
“When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State,
that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual
persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private
spheres” and it “demeans the lives of homosexual persons.”59
Most recently, in United States v. Windsor,60 the Court
invalidated the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which prevented
same-sex married couples from receiving federal benefits associated
with marriage.61 Again, the Court held that the statute violated both
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, by finding that it was
not rationally related to any legitimate governmental interest.62
III. OBERGEFELL V. HODGES
Obergefell involves consolidated cases from Michigan,
Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee, where marriage was defined as “a
union between one man and one woman.”63 Fourteen same-sex
couples and two men whose same-sex partners are deceased brought
suit, claiming the denial of the right to marry their same-sex partners
or to legally recognize their same-sex marriages lawfully performed
in another state violated the Fourteenth Amendment.64 Each district

54. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 443.
55. Id. at 444–54.
56. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
57. Id. at 578.
58. Id. at 575.
59. Id.
60. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
61. Id. at 2695.
62. Id. at 2693 (holding that a “bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular
group cannot justify disparate treatment of that group”).
63. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).
64. Id.
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court ruled in the petitioners’ favor.65 The Sixth Circuit consolidated
the cases and reversed, holding that there is no constitutional
obligation to license or recognize same-sex marriages.66
The Supreme Court granted certiorari as to two questions:
(1) whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to issue
marriage licenses to two people of the same sex; and (2) whether the
Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to recognize same-sex
marriages licensed and performed in another state.67 The Court
answered “yes” to both questions.68
The Court began its opinion by establishing the historical
importance of marriage, describing the changes in the law over time
regarding marriage, and listing cases that demonstrate public shifts in
perception regarding homosexuality.69 It wove this notion of
emerging attitudes and legal rights into the opinion to set up its
holding that same-sex couples have the right to marry.70
The Court then declared that marriage is a fundamental right
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.71 The
Court cited four principles for finding that the right to marry is
fundamental: (1) it is a personal choice regarding individual
autonomy;72 (2) “it supports a two-person union unlike any other in
its importance to the committed individuals;”73 (3) it safeguards
children and families and draws meaning from the related rights of
childrearing, procreation, and education;74 and (4) it is “a keystone of
our social order.”75
But instead of continuing with the Due Process Clause’s strict
scrutiny analysis, the Court then discussed the Equal Protection
Clause, explaining that the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment work together and “may be
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2599 (“[S]ame-sex couples may exercise the right to marry.”); id. at 2608
(“[T]here is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage
performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex character.”).
69. Id. at 2597.
70. See id. at 2602 (Rights rise “from a better informed understanding of how constitutional
imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era.”).
71. Id. at 2599 (“[T]he reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with
equal force to same-sex couples” as it has previously applied to opposite-sex couples.).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2600 (internal citations omitted).
75. Id. at 2601.
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instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other.”76 It explained
that the Court did just this, relying on both the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses to previously invalidate prohibitions on
interracial marriage and marriages involving a father who is behind
on child support.77
The Court then explained that it was inappropriate to wait and
let the legislature deal with the issue, because prohibiting same-sex
marriage abridges a fundamental right,78 same-sex couples are being
harmed in the interim,79 and allowing same-sex couples to get
married would not negatively impact opposite-sex marriages.80
Finally, it established that each state must recognize same-sex
marriages legally performed in another state.81 In a comparatively
short three paragraphs, the Court noted that to rule otherwise “would
maintain and promote instability and uncertainty.”82 The Court then
explained that because each state is now required by the Constitution
to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, there is no “lawful
basis” to permit states to refuse to acknowledge a same-sex marriage
legally performed in another state on the basis of its same-sex
character.83
Justices Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito all published
dissents in the case. Justice Roberts first asserted that the question of
whether to legalize same-sex marriage is a matter for the legislature,
not for judges, to decide.84 He then noted that marriage has been
traditionally and historically defined as being between one man and
one woman.85 He noted that this issue was already raised (and
dismissed) in the case Baker v. Nelson,86 which arose shortly after
the Loving case, and attempted to use the same logic to legalize
same-sex marriages.87 He then reiterated the notion that judges must
“‘exercise the utmost care’ in identifying implied fundamental rights,
76. Id. at 2603.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 2605–06.
79. See id. at 2606 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190–95 (1986) and Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
80. See id. at 2606–07.
81. Id. at 2607–08.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2611 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“But this Court is not a legislature. Whether
same-sex marriage is a good idea should be of no concern to us.”).
85. Id. at 2612.
86. Id. at 2615 (citing Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972)).
87. Id.
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‘lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly
transformed into the policy preferences of the Members of this
Court.’”88 He further noted that this decision may open the door to
polygamy, because there do not appear to be any legally cognizable
reasons that the “two-person” element of marriage would withstand,
while the “man-woman element” would not.89 Finally, he criticizes
the majority’s determination that there exists a “synergy between”
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, and notes that the
majority does not proceed with the standard Equal Protection
analysis.90
The other three dissenting justices largely agreed. Justice Scalia
wrote separately to emphasize the idea that the debate over same-sex
marriage was “American democracy at its best,”91 and something
that is better left to the legislature than to be decided by judges.92
Justice Thomas noted that he disagrees with substantive due process
generally, and does not think judges should create additional
“fundamental rights” not explicitly listed in the Constitution.93 But
even if substantive due process were permissible, he argued, there
has been no requisite deprivation of liberty.94 Finally, Alito noted
that same-sex marriage is not rooted in our history or traditions, but
instead is a relatively new right.95
IV. POTENTIAL RAMIFICATIONS OF OBERGEFELL
The most apparent problem with the Obergefell decision is that
it asserts the idea that marriage is a fundamental right protected by
the Due Process Clause.96 But if marriage is a fundamental right,
then every state law regulating marriage must withstand strict
scrutiny. Potentially, this could prevent states from prohibiting
marriages between siblings, or from setting age limits on marriage,
or from denying a person who is already married the right to marry
another.97

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 2616 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)).
Id. at 2621.
Id. at 2623.
Id. at 2627.
See id.
Id. at 2631.
Id. at 2632.
Id. at 2640 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2604.
See id. at 2621–23 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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Second, the reasoning in Obergefell unnecessarily adds to our
murky Equal Protection/Due Process hybrid jurisprudence without
providing any clear limitations on when some hybrid analysis of the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses is appropriate, as opposed
to following the analysis of one, the other, or both. As the Court
explained:
Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal
protection may rest on different precepts and are not always
coextensive, yet in some instances each may be instructive
as to the meaning and reach of the other. In any particular
case one Clause may be thought to capture the essence of
the right in a more accurate and comprehensive way, even
as the two Clauses may converge in the identification and
definition of the right. This interrelation of the two
principles furthers our understanding of what freedom is
and must become.98
But “some instances” does not instruct on how this doctrine can
be limited, or when it is appropriate. This “I’ll know it when I see it”
approach to constitutionally protected civil rights may achieve the
desired result of legalizing same-sex marriage, but it does so on very
shaky legal grounds, and only adds to confusion about when laws
violate the Equal Protection and/or Due Process Clauses.99
V. ALTERNATIVE WAYS THE COURT COULD HAVE RULED
The potential problems created by Obergefell could have been
avoided in several ways. One of the big criticisms with the decision
is that, while gay marriage is now legal, the LGBT community still
faces discrimination in areas such as housing and employment.100
The easiest way the Court could have legalized gay marriage and
also addressed the problem of housing and employment
discrimination would have been to hold that homosexuals are a
protected class, pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause. In fact,
Justice Ginsburg suggested in a recent interview that this is how she
would have written the opinion, had it been hers to write. 101 By

98. Id. at 2603 (citations omitted).
99. See id. at 2623 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
100. See Esseks, supra note 5; Lorenz, supra note 5; Green, supra note 5; Ura, supra note 5.
101. See Mark Joseph Stern, Ruth Bader Ginsberg Reveals How She Would Have Written the
Marriage Equality Decision, SLATE (July 30, 2015, 10:36 AM), http://www.slate.com/
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determining that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
runs afoul of the Equal Protection Clause, then any law, which
discriminates on that basis, would be subject to strict scrutiny,102 and
more often than not, invalidated.
Alternatively, the Court could have invalidated the laws, which
ban same-sex marriage on Equal Protection grounds using the
already-existing gender discrimination class, following the reasoning
in Loving. Just as a law preventing a person of one race from
marrying a person of another race impermissibly classifies on the
basis of race, a law preventing a person of one gender from marrying
a person of the same gender impermissibly classifies on the basis of
gender. However, because laws which classify on the basis of gender
are only subjected to the less-exacting “intermediate scrutiny,”103 it
would have been a slightly harder case to uphold same-sex marriage,
but not impossible. Certainly, opponents of same-sex marriage
would point out the physical differences between same-sex and
opposite-sex couples, and the relative effects on procreation.104 But
fertility is not currently a requirement of marriage.
Finally, the Court could have simply held that laws, which
prohibit same-sex marriage, are derived from a bare desire to harm
homosexuals, and as such, bear no rational basis to a legitimate state
interest.
Any one of these three alternative Equal Protection rationales
would avoid the problems caused by declaring marriage a
fundamental right and would legalize same-sex marriage on much
clearer grounds.
VI. CONCLUSION
Many proponents of same-sex marriage applaud the recent
decision in Obergefell.105 Unfortunately, the decision prevents only
discrimination in the marriage context, as opposed to setting up the
framework to prohibit discrimination in areas such as housing and
employment, which are certainly also “central to individual dignity
and autonomy.”106 The decision also employs a confusing “hybrid”
blogs/the_slatest/2015/07/30/ruth_bader_ginsburg_on_marriage_equality_how_she_would_have
_written_the.html.
102. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
103. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2717 (2013) (citations omitted).
104. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct at 2613 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
105. See Epps, supra note 3; Liptak, supra note 3; Ennis, supra note 3.
106. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597.
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analysis,107 combining both the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses in a vague way to exceed the threshold of constitutionality,
instead of simply relying on either the traditional Due Process or
Equal Protection Clauses. Furthermore, by declaring marriage a
fundamental right, pursuant to the Due Process Clause, the door has
been opened to potentially invalidate other common restrictions on
marriage, such as age, marital status, and familial relationship.
A much clearer and stronger decision would have been to decide
this case under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court could have
invalidated the laws by declaring that classification on the basis of
sexual orientation is impermissible, pursuant to Equal Protection.
Alternatively, the Court could have decided this case as an
impermissible gender classification under the Equal Protection
Clause, following the same reasoning as Loving. Finally, the Court
could have held that the laws banning same-sex marriage were
enacted out of a bare desire to harm, and as such, there is no
legitimate state interest under rational basis review.
Any one of these three alternatives would have achieved the
desired result of legalizing same-sex marriage, but on
clearly-established Equal Protection grounds. This would eliminate
both the potential impact on other laws, which restrict marriage, and
also the potential confusion by allowing laws to be invalidated due to
the nebulous combination of Due Process and Equal Protection
principles “in some instances.”108

107. See id. at 2602–03.
108. Id. at 2603.
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